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Abstract 
For a French village, we reconstitute most families and build accurate measurements 
of economic conditions. Combined with marriage contracts (systematic in this written-
law area), we are able to control for wealth, Stem households and social status of father 
and husband for a representative sample. We clarify the operation of the EMP system: 
bad economic conditions resulted in later female age at marriage, which had positive 
consequences, such as fewer children, adjusting the population level, and a smaller age 
difference between spouses, allowing greater agency for women within the couple. A 
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Over the last few years, several economists and economic historians have argued that 
economic development was fostered, or even initiated, by a supposed specific European 
Marriage Pattern (EMP) identified by Hajnal (1965).1 This pattern would be 
characterized by comparatively late female marriage age, a high proportion of female 
celibacy and the prevalence of the nuclear family whereas, outside western Europe, 
almost all girls married at young ages and lived in extended families. Linking this 
western family organization to economic development, various causal mechanisms have 
been proposed in the literature including an adjustment of population to economic 
resources through delayed marriage and celibacy, the improvement of women’s 
position, and a higher investment in human capital. Unfortunately, there is only limited 
evidence to support these supposed mechanisms. Moreover, in an important 
contribution, Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) offer arguments that contradict the theory 
concerning an effect, and even the existence, of a specific EMP. 
In this paper, we review the debates about the EMP, clarifying the assumptions and 
mechanisms at play. We then offer an explicit quantitative test at the individual level 
of four of the supposed mechanisms of the EMP. We study the marriage behavior of 
the inhabitants of Montesquieu-Volvestre (hereafter MV), a village representative of 
southern France, between 1660 and 1789. In this written-law area, marriage contracts 
were almost systematic, offering a unique opportunity to collect detailed information 
on each spouse. Using the parish registers, we also reconstructed most of the families. 
We use the volatility of the monthly price of wheat to assess economic uncertainty, the 
value of farm production (proxied by the tithe) to measure farming revenue, and local 
real estate activity to capture the overall economic situation. The formal institutions 
of the village remained fairly stable during the period concerned, but it suffered variable 
economic conditions, including different adverse events (plague, wars, bad crops). MV 
is also interesting because typical of the southern European area that missed the 
economic take-off.  
Female Age at Marriage (FAM) and definitive female celibacy are the two phenomena 
that are supposed to be sensitive to economic conditions in the EMP context. We focus 
on FAM because both Hajnal (1965) and later historical demographers (e.g. Chaunu, 
1966; Wrigley, 1985) emphasized it as the most important factor, as it affected most 
of the population. Moreover, the female celibacy rate cannot be observed at a given 
 
1 For instance, Greif (2006), Voigtländer and Voth (2009, 2013), De Moor and Van Zanden (2010), 




point in time but only at the end of a woman’s life, thus making it unsuitable for 
investigating its relationship with a variable economic context.  
Running survival regressions on a representative sample, we model the duration of 
female celibate life until marriage. We show that FAM does respond to economic 
context. Bad economic conditions raised FAM, as hypothesized by EMP theory. In a 
second step, we provide empirical support for two of the supposed positive consequences 
of this adjustment of the FAM to economic conditions. We confirm the adjustment of 
the population to economic resources by observing a lower fertility of marriages 
characterized by a higher FAM (i.e. registered during bad times). Second, we clarify 
that, while relatively high female agency is a characteristic of EMP populations, it 
increases within the couple during bad times.2 We establish a link between FAM and 
the difference in age between the spouses (a traditional indicator of a woman’s 
position): a higher FAM is associated with a reduced gender age gap, showing an 
increase in the woman’s agency within her couple. We are confident concerning 
causality because this relation holds when the FAM is instrumented by the economic 
conditions we have previously studied. Finally, using literacy as a proxy for human 
capital, we do not observe a statistically significant effect of late FAM on a higher 
investment in human capital (on either women or their children), but an economic 
policy hostile to literacy could skew our observations. All these statistical relationships 
are obtained while controlling for individual-specific factors such as wealth at marriage, 
social status of the woman’s father, social status of her husband and settlement in a 
Stem family. We also control for general factors such as taxation, wars, diseases, 
municipal freedom and strength of state control.  
This evidence constitutes an important contribution because we test the operation of 
a full system of relationships supposed by the EMP. Moreover, the investigation is 
carried out at individual level with detailed information, whereas most research 
investigates this kind of phenomena after aggregation at the level of a community.3 As 
implications, MV being in a Stem-family area, our research invalidates the necessity of 
the Nuclear family as a prerequisite of the EMP; only Communitarian families are 
unsuitable for EMP. As the MV area missed the economic take-off, our results do not 
 
2 A higher women’s bargaining power within the household is favorable for economic development (Diebolt 
and Perrin, 2019). 




support the EMP as being the crucial characteristic explaining the acceleration of 
growth.  
We first review the debates about the EMP and then depict the historical background 
of MV before laying out our sources and descriptive statistics. We then consider the 
effect of the economic conditions, before testing the three positive outcomes of this 
relationship. This is followed by a conclusion. 
 
THE DEBATES ABOUT THE EUROPEAN MARRIAGE PATTERN 
According to Hajnal (1965), the EMP is characterized by a late FAM, high female 
celibacy and the prevalence of the Nuclear family. Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) 
correctly stressed that the organization of western European families was much more 
diverse than in Hajnal’s definition. Anthropologists have indeed documented that in 
many areas of Western Europe, households were not Nuclear. Regarding the two other 
characteristics (FAM and celibacy rate), Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) also point out 
important variations within Europe. Their main argument is the lack of correlation 
between economic growth recorded in one area and its FAM and celibacy rate. They 
argue that this lack of correlation demonstrates the inconsistency of the supposed 
effects of the EMP. 
Carmichael et al. (2016) reject this argument explaining that, in the EMP context, 
FAM (and celibacy rate) depends on the economic conditions: a high FAM is not a 
characteristic of the EMP (as assumed by several authors starting with Hajnal, 1965) 
but only one potential manifestation if economic conditions are bad. We can thus 
expect high levels of FAM and celibacy in bad economic contexts and vice versa, as 
actually observed by Dennison and Ogilvie (2014). Carmichael et al. (2016) base their 
argument on a different definition of the EMP as characterized by consensus of the 
spouses (in other words, high status for women) and neo-locality of the couple (Nuclear 
family). To settle a new Nuclear family required having enough economic resources, 
imposing delayed marriage in the event of bad economic conditions. This necessity 
makes it possible to observe very different FAM (and celibacy rates) for populations 
characterized by the EMP but under different economic circumstances. This new 





The arguments of Carmichael et al. (2016) are in line with traditional, but somewhat 
neglected, ways of explaining Western European demography. Approximately the same 
mechanism was proposed by Dupâquier (1972) based on what he called the “marriage 
settlement”, in which “nuptiality varying according to the economic conditions would 
be the key mechanism” (Bideau, 1983). Cantillon (1755) already described the 
mechanism of delayed marriage in Europe: “When laborers and artisans do not marry, 
it is because they wait until they have saved enough to enable them to set up a 
household”.4  
Carmichael et al. (2016) have thus proposed a new definition of the EMP but backed 
by very little evidence. They mention the low age at marriage (around 20) in the UK 
and the Netherlands after the Great Plague. The rise in this age during the sixteenth 
century is assumed to be due to a decline in real wages, caused by inflation. A third 
indication is offered by the decrease in the age of marriage of European emigrants to 
North America or South Africa because they enjoyed better economic conditions in 
these new lands.5 But existing studies offer contradicting evidence. Weir (1984a) rejects 
an effect of the FAM on fertility in England before 1750. Other evidence, although 
taken from later periods, supports the opposite mechanism (i.e. favorable economic 
conditions, especially for women, increase FAM and reduce fertility). Using the 1911 
census of England and Wales, Crafts (1989) finds a negative correlation between 
women’s local labor-force opportunities and marital fertility. Hacker (2008) offers 
evidence from the 1860 US census that women tended to marry later in areas in which 
economic opportunities for women were greater. Wanamaker (2012) links 
industrialization with declining fertility in 19th century South Carolina. In late 19th 
century Bavaria, Brown and Guinnane (2002) find that women’s earnings opportunities 
had only a small effect on fertility.  
Our investigations are made in the framework exposed in Carmichael et al. (2016) but 
with two slight modifications. First, we assume that EMP is characterized by a non-
Communitarian family, while Carmichael et al. (2016) retain Nuclear family criteria. 
 
4 Cantillon also stressed the difference with China: “The Chinese, by the principles of their religion, are 
obliged to marry, and raise as many children as their means of subsistence will afford. They look upon it 
as a crime to use land for pleasure gardens or parks, cheating the public of food.” 
5 FAM of French populations settled in Quebec was also low, associated with a very high fertility (Galor 
and Klemp, 2014). The French FAM reached its historical minimum (below 23) during the Trente 
Glorieuses of 1945-1975 (Diebolt and Perrin, 2017:10). Perrin (2020) investigates how the EMP evolved in 





Nuclear families, in which young adults move out of the family to marry, are typical 
of northwest Europe but a large part of Western Europe (e.g. Germanic area, Basque 
country, south-west France) exhibit a Stem family system in which one of the siblings 
(usually the eldest son) remained at the parental home after marriage, inheriting the 
main assets.6 We reject the Nuclear family as a necessary requirement for the EMP 
because our empirical evidence comes from an area characterized by a Stem family 
system. In reality, in a Stem family system, only one sibling enjoys favorable conditions 
for settling in the parental home; we do observe lower FAM and Male Age at Marriage 
(MAM) when accompanied by a Stem-settlement. Others had to marry an heir or 
heiress or be economically able to establish an independent household. As a 
consequence, the Stem family system also imposes the necessity of having sufficient 
economic resources before marrying for most of the population. Second, we classically 
assume that high female status within the society is a characteristic of the EMP, but 
we specify that female agency within the couple is sensitive to economic conditions 
through FAM. When economic conditions are bad, gender age gap decreases, attesting 
a stronger position for the woman in her couple. This sensitivity of female agency to 
economic conditions offers an additional check, providing more efficient teams for 
confronting difficult times.  
We follow existing literature in predicting that the adjustment of FAM in the EMP 
has two other positive outcomes, namely an adjustment of the population to economic 
resource (the so-called Malthusian preventive check) and increased investment in 
human capital. Finally, sustaining beneficial cultural norms and fostering cooperative 
institutions are two other potential positive consequences, or associated characteristics, 
of the EMP stressed in the literature, but that we were unable to test.  
Outside Western Europe and a few areas in East Asia (Korean and Japanese families 
are also Stem according to anthropologists; see Todd, 2011), family organizations across 
Eurasia were Communitarian. All the sons married and brought their spouses into the 
parental household (e.g. Russia, China); in the Arab world, the Communitarian family 
is endogamic because cousins were expected to marry. This led to large households 
splitting when the sustainable size was exceeded. In these contexts, the Communitarian 
family provided resources to any new couple, removing the economic constraint on 
 




marriage.7 In these populations, definitive celibacy was very rare and few girls delayed 
their marriages much beyond puberty (Chesnais, 1992). The FAM is thus orthogonal 
to economic conditions by remaining systematically low. This constant low FAM had 
different socio-economic consequences than the EMP; a few observations from non-
EMP areas are presented for comparison in the course of this paper. 
There is a major discrepancy between views assuming family behavior, especially the 
EMP, as a fundamental cause and others, understanding family behavior as the result 
of formal institutions (see Dennison and Ogilvie, 2014). Obviously, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to settle the debate definitively, as family behaviors are embedded within 
formal institutions. Assuming formal institutions as the main driver, EMP is only one 
among several outcomes. Thereby, good institutions lead to both high female status, 
high FAM and economic growth; the causes of these good inherited institutions 
constitute another debate. The economic take-off of northern Europe would be mainly 
caused by its specific formal institutions and not to its EMP, which is shared with 
areas economically lagging.  
The proponents of the EMP assume this family behavior to be a fundamental cause, 
debating only its origins. Foreman-Peck (2009) builds a model in which restricted 
European fertility through late marriage results from low mortality. For Voigtländer 
and Voth (2009, 2013), the EMP emerged as the consequence of the Black Death: land 
abundance triggered a shift toward the pastoral sector offering economic opportunities 
for women, resulting in later marriages; this is contested by Edwards and Ogilvie 
(2018). De Moor and Van Zanden (2010) stress the impact of the Catholic doctrine on 
marriage consent and high female status; such an effect of Catholicism is demonstrated 
for many psychological traits (Schulz et al., 2019).8 The origin of the EMP could be 
even older. Anthropologists accept high female status as a characteristic of primitive 
populations (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2010; Hansen et al., 2015). This primitive 
characteristic of high female status could have been maintained in western Europe 
because of the distance from China and the Fertile Crescent, the centers of family 
innovations; the same applies to the Nuclear and Stem family models, which could be 
the most primitive, with Communitarian families being the result of successive 
innovations (Todd, 2011).9  
 
7 Laslett (1983) explains that a large number of kin living in complex households formed unique working 
units capable of incorporating newly-married couples that therefore did not have to wait to acquire 
economic independence. 
8 The Church gradually imposed across western Europe the publication of the banns, preventing polygyny, 
prohibited divorce, preventing the repudiation of women, and finally considered marriage as a sacrament 
for which the wife should give her free consent, providing women with wide freedom of choice. 
9 Ancient DNA of prehistorical Europe seems to support this age-old prevalence of high female status 




Whatever its exact origin, in this paper we assume that the family behavior of western 
Europe known as EMP acts as a fundamental cause of social and economic phenomena 
and not as an outcome. Inherited formal institutions certainly also contribute but to a 
lesser extent. Observed formal institutions are also partially the result of an underlying 
situation; a prosperous society will exhibit well-functioning formal institutions. 
Moreover, the inherited formal institutions could reflect fundamental family behavior, 
as assumed by anthropologists (e.g. Todd, 1985) or economists (e.g. the works of Greif).    
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Montesquieu-Volvestre is a village of south-west France. Before 1800, about 80% of the 
French population lived in rural areas (Molinier, 1977). MV is a bastide (a new town) 
founded in 1238, 50 km south of Toulouse in the Languedoc. The Languedoc province 
had a governing body called the Estates providing public services with its own officers 
and collecting most of the taxation. This Estates was governed by an assembly 
composed of representatives elected each year (half of them were from towns while 
nobility and clergy designated a quarter each) specially to vote taxes. Any decision of 
this local authority or of the central executive had to be registered (and thus accepted) 
by the Toulouse Parliament, whose members were independent as owners of their 
offices. Like all of southern France, MV was under the Roman civil law. Inhabitants 
enjoyed several specific rights stated in the charter of the bastide. Like almost all 
villages in southern France, MV claimed to be a Republic managing community issues 
on its own (Post, 1946). Every year, the inhabitants (or to be precise, all taxpayers) 
elected four Consuls from among the eight designated by the four previous Consuls. 
In Languedoc, the feudal conditions were mild and unrestrictive. There was no 
dominant lord playing a crucial social role, and lordship (i.e. ownership of a seigneurie) 
and being noble were two distinct notions. Everyone could become a lord by providing 
the right to enjoy a piece of land in exchange for a perpetual rent (cens) through a 
written contract.10 The lord kept the propriété éminente, which generated only low 
revenues in our period, because most of the cens rents, set at a nominal value during 
the Middle Ages, had fallen considerably in real terms due to inflation (Frêche, 1974).11 
Properties without lords, called alleux (5.7% of the total area of MV) were exempted 
 
10 The rule is “no lord without a title” whereas in northern France, the rule is “no land without a lord”. 
11 Only the tax on transactions (called lods) represented significant lordship revenues in our period, but 




from any taxation, whether the owner was noble or not; a noble owning land that was 
not alleux paid the standard tax.  
It is often argued that in societies of pre-industrial Europe, marriage was regulated by 
community, landlord and guilds (Ogilvie, 1997: 225). This is not the case in this part 
of France. In MV, there is no role for regulation by a lord. Such (non-binding) guilds 
as existed in MV had no strong coercive power on social life, playing mainly a religious 
role; almost all the population was Catholic.12 Despite their power to manage public 
affairs, the Consuls did not have any role regarding marriage, settlement and nuptiality.  
MV is representative of most of southern France extending into part of Catalunya and 
northern Italy. Indeed, the people of this area spoke different versions of the Occitan 
language (Catalan is a language very close to Occitan) and shared the same municipal 
(administrated by elected Consuls) and legal (Roman law) institutions (Gouron 1963, 
Salvatori 2002). They also mainly shared the Stem family practice (Todd, 2011). Like 
Languedoc, Provence and the Pyrenean valleys enjoyed their own Estates (Bisson, 
1964). This covered large populations. In 1700, the Languedoc itself accounted for 
1,600,000 inhabitants. Adding the Généralités of Provence, Montauban, Roussillon, 
Foix, Auch, Pau, Bordeaux and Bayonne, the total population living in a similar 
context in the French kingdom alone was about 4.7 million (de Dainville, 1952). At 
this time, the population of England is estimated at 5,200,000.   
Economic activity in MV was diverse, even if mainly based on agriculture. According 
to the cadaster of 1662, 30% of the municipal surface was vineyards, while the main 
remaining area was arable land. Common lands were marginal (two small woods and 
one meadow, representing 1.3% of the surface). Pastoralism was limited.13 In addition 
to agriculture, about one quarter of the men worked in textile-related activities 
connecting MV to international markets, because wool came from Spain while 
production was sold as far away as the Levant. This textile activity did not require 
substantial capital because weaving looms were small, cheap and often provided by the 
merchant-manufacturer (the intermediaries); in fact, the main investment was in 
 
12 A 1744 study shows that Protestants accounted for 0.24% of the population of the Rieux diocese, which 
includes MV (Frêche 1974: 439). 




financing the wool. MV was a significant component of the whole of Languedoc’s textile 
production, estimated to be the largest French production area (Thomson, 1983: 61).14 
Property was widely distributed among the population. An active real estate market 
(see below) was supported by mortgages (allowed under the Roman law) distributed 
through notaries. Using the fiscal value of all the properties (3,690) owned by 659 
persons or institutions as reported in the cadaster of 1662, the Gini coefficient is 0.72.15 
This denotes a wealth distribution not too inegalitarian; the Gini coefficient of wealth 
(not revenues) of modern France is 0.73, 0.81 in the US and 0.55 in Japan (Davies et 
al., 2009). More broadly, these 659 owners for a locality of about 2,000 inhabitants 
(implying 3 inhabitants per owner) means that almost every family owned a few plots 
of land. Population seems to remain stable apart from a probable decline at the end of 
the 17th century and an increase at the end of the 18th.16 
An important feature regarding our theme is the Stem family model observed in South-
west France. Based on the 1,293 marriage contracts from which we acquired this 
information (see below), we observe 242 cases indicating that the new household settled 
in the family of one of the spouses (in the husband’s family in 71% of the cases). These 
figures give a rate of 21%, but we can suppose that the actual rate was slightly higher 
because it was not an obligation to mention this family organization in the marriage 
contract. Taking into account the mortality of the parents and that only one child is 
allowed to live with his parents, this rate clearly denotes a Stem family as opposed to 
a Nuclear family system in which such a cohabitation is very unusual, or a 
Communitarian family in which several married sons live in the parental home.17  
This Stem settlement implies that inheritance inequality was practiced. While the 
Roman law theoretically requires equal shares of inheritance among both male and 
female siblings, the practice in southern France was to use the freedom to bequest to 
create some inequality. Typically, the main asset (farm or craft-shop) was transmitted 
to the sibling remaining in the parental home while others received marginal assets, as 
 
14 This proto-industrialization was not a preliminary of modern industrialization but of a near-total de-
industrialization. 
15 14% of the value was owned by residents of other locations but was taken into account (inhabitants of 
MV were also likely to own properties in other areas). Alleux are exempted. The Gini coefficient reaches 
0.76 if we add 138 beggars (number mentioned in 1695) with a wealth equal to zero. 
16 Reliable observations of the population are: 1693: 600 households, 1734: 2,057 inhabitants, 1778: 600 
households, 1781: 618 households, 1788: 2,806 inhabitants, 1793: 2,670 (See Tallec, 2013).  




dowry when marrying (for both sons and daughters) or at parental death. Non-heir 
siblings could remain living in the parental home, working for the family entity, but 
were not allowed to marry without leaving (Pélaquier, 1999). These family links 
reduced the number of individuals falling into beggary. So, typical of a Stem area, there 
is no system of poor relief; conversely, England enjoyed early comprehensive Poor Laws 
because the poor were typically aged people without the support of their children 
(Solar, 1995).  
This Stem household practice is accompanied by high social status for women typical 
of western Europe. As head of household paying tax (property taxes and capitation), 
it was possible for a woman to vote to elect yearly consuls; in the cadaster of 1662, 
5.5% of owners are female. A woman could ask for separation as to property (a kind of 
civil divorce) when things turned bad with her husband (Richardot, 1930). This 
practice was not rare and seems to have been socially acceptable; even the few single 
(un-married) mothers did not suffer any specific regulation. Such a separation was easy 
because the dowry remained the wife’s full property managed by herself, and it was 
impossible to pledge any asset brought as dowry, even with the wife’s agreement.18 
When brought as capital, women were considered as privileged creditors on the couple’s 
assets (Boyer, 1936; Hilaire, 1966). As a result of women’s agency regarding their assets, 
about half (45%) of the 1,138 wills we found in notary registers are made by women. 
Women also account for about 20% of the sellers in the real estate transactions we 
have recorded (see Table 1 below), but only 3.3% of the buyers, showing that even if 
they managed their inherited wealth, they were rarely an active buyer in their own 
name (actually this figure reflects only single women buyers because married women 
bought through their husbands’ name). This figure doubles if we count associations 
that combined a woman and a man (often an older family member). We also have a 
snapshot of female celibacy when the Capitation tax was implemented in 1695: 10% of 












Assessing the economic conditions is complex because there is no single clear-cut 
measure. The concept of a wage is weakly operant in our context. Indeed, most of the 
population did not work as employees but as independent workers, whether in textiles, 
crafts or farming. As previously explained, land ownership was not concentrated but 
divided among numerous family farms with few employees; higher land concentration 
in parts of northern France or in England (Dyer, 2005) led a large part of the labor 
force, even in rural areas, to work as employees. The same is true for textiles; there 
were no large manufactures but only family workshops whose production was then 
collected by merchant-manufacturers. The percentage of Daymen was limited (30%) 
and most of these also owned plots of land.  
Rather than looking for an inappropriate average wage for a given period, we thus 
assess the economic situation using three complementary indicators. First, we assess 
the economic uncertainty through the volatility of the wheat price. For each year, we 
compute the standard deviation of the monthly changes of the wheat prices traded in 
Toulouse (Frêche and Frêche, 1967). Second, we build a consistent proxy of farm 
revenues through the value of the tithe collected in the area. As the grain was produced 
by a multitude of individual farmers, a high price could be good news for them if the 
volumes produced are also high.19 The value of the tithe depended on both the volume 
produced and the sale price. Frêche (1972) provides data about the value in Tours 
pounds (livres tournois, or lt.) of the tithe collected in two villages close to MV (Martres 
and Mauvezin). The tithe was farmed out each year in June, when the next crop could 
be estimated accurately. Both the rates and the basis (the farming surface area) 
remained about constant over time, enabling consistent comparisons over a long period. 
These values in Tours pounds are converted into grams of silver to obtain the real 
values of farming production. 
Our third indicator captures overall economic prosperity, on the basis of real estate 
activity. We collected all the real estate transactions recorded in MV over our period 
(7,214 transactions, including 3,888 sales of properties in MV). Rather than using the 
 
19 Typically, high demand in the Mediterranean area would increase the wheat price in Toulouse. In some 





market value of the transactions realized each year, we use the fiscal value (called 
Allivrement) of the properties exchanged.20 This enables us to control for any noise 
coming from monetary inflation. The value of the properties exchanged stands as proxy 
for the economic conditions of the whole community, including textile workers and 
craftsmen because they bought houses and workshops, as well as farmland as an 
investment or for part-time professional activity (see Postel-Vinay, 1998). To assess 
the economic conditions that prevailed before the marriage at each point in time, we 
use ten-year averages of our three economic measures.  
We also control for factors not directly related to economic conditions but that 
negatively affected the life of the inhabitants and could cause delays in marrying. First, 
we built a dummy series for major disease periods as revealed by quarantine 
regulations. A second series takes the value 1 if MV had to billet soldiers or when 
battles took place in northern Spain; note that military operations in Spain did not 
mean men from MV going to war but paying for the war.21 A third series is the amount 
(in silver) of the tax collected (we add the sums collected in MV for Taille, Capitation 
and Vingtième). Here also high fiscal pressure, in a given year, could lead to postponing 
a marriage; however, this tax pressure is partially dependent on the economic 
conditions, because we can suspect the French state of increasing taxation during good 
times and because the MV Consuls could request, and did indeed obtain, tax cuts when 
the economic situation was bad. As a consequence, the taxation variable necessarily 
partially reflects the economic conditions. Two other dummy variables are for 
institutional changes: stronger central state control (value 1) through a suspension of 
the Languedoc Estates between 1731 and 1752, and for reduced communal autonomy 
(value 1) during periods when an office of mayor could be bought and sold and when 





20 In the cadaster, all the properties of the commune were valued by experts in units of account (Florins), 
see Tallec (2013). 
21 Only three regiments were Languedoc-based during our time period. From 1688, the Languedoc had to 
maintain a militia with men drawn by lot, but it was only one man for the entire diocese of Rieux and 






We collected data about the marriages celebrated from 1660 to 1789 from three sources. 
First, we went through all the nine parish registers in which the Church recorded all 
celebrated marriages from 1660 to 1789.22 Despite one missing register between 1700 
and 1714, we identified 2,047 marriages. Second, from death and birth parish registers, 
we inferred the existence of other marriages whenever two spouses were mentioned, 
raising our total number of identified marriages to 3,757. These inferred marriages are 
made up of those celebrated during the absence of a parish register for 1700-1714, those 
celebrated outside MV, and many that we can also suspect of having occurred before 
1660. This is as close as we could come concerning the total number of marriages in 
MV between 1660 and 1789. Using these sources, we reconstructed the families 
following the method pioneered by Louis Henry (1956).  
The third source involved the marriage contracts available in the notary registers. In 
the part of France under the Roman civil law (written-law country), almost all 
marriages were accompanied by a notarized contract, even for the poor (Hilaire, 1994). 
Such a source of information is less relevant in northern France (Goubert, 1960), where 
marital relationships were ruled by “custom”. We explored all the notary records 
available in MV notaries as well as those of inhabitants of MV but recorded in Rieux-
Volvestre (the local administrative centre) between 1660 and 1789.23 Among these 
records, we identified 1,293 marriage contracts.  
Sample selection 
We base most of our investigations on a reduced sample of marriages for which we 
have all the relevant information (contract and FAM). We suppose our sample to be 
representative as its components are entirely the result of chance. We know that 
focusing on marriage with contracts does not create any bias because almost all 
marriages were accompanied by a notary contract. A detailed study in the Toulouse 
area shows that 95% of marriages were formalized with contracts in 1812 (Sicard, 1997).  
The difference between the number of marriages identified in the parish registers and 
those found in notary records is easy to explain. First, the contract could be recorded 
 
22Archives of the Haute-Garonne: 2 E 1381-1389. Available online http://archives.haute-garonne.fr. 




by a notary outside MV and Rieux-Volvestre. Thanks to the registers of the Droit 
d’enregistrement (a 1% tax on the transaction amount), we observe that 15% of the 
real-estate transactions on MV properties were recorded by notaries outside MV; we 
can thus infer approximately the same rate for marriage contracts.24 Second, and more 
crucially, there are many more missing notary registers compared to the single missing 
volume of parish records. Indeed, notary registers have been kept due to chance. For 
instance, all the records of the notary of Castagnac, a small village near MV, who 
certainly registered many of the MV contracts, are missing. In MV, there are sometimes 
four and at least two notaries.25 Assuming two notaries, 36% of the registers are missing 
over our time period; this is a lower bound estimation.26 
The sample we mainly focus on is also reduced due to the small number of cases for 
which we can observe the FAM. One weakness of these marriage contracts is the 
infrequent mention of the birth date or age of the spouses, making it most of the time 
impossible to directly compute the FAM. Any mention of the age of those concerned 
is only due to chance (certain notaries habitually mentioned the birthdate in the 
marriage contract). For other cases, it is necessary to match the marriage contract with 
the parish birth registers. Unfortunately, we often have several potential matching 
births for frequent names and surnames. We retain birth data only when we are sure 
of the match, i.e. when we have the names of parents in both the marriage contract 
and the parish registers. Moreover, besides the parish register missing in the middle of 
our series, some registers are badly damaged, leaving some of the writing illegible. 
Fortunately, these sources of missing data are random and statistically orthogonal to 
the phenomenon we are studying, thus avoiding any bias in the available sample. 
We finally have 596 marriages for which we have reliable data.27 By focusing on the 
first marriage (excluding second marriages) we keep 557 observations; second marriages 
 
24 Tallec (2013: 1171). 
25 See the details of the existing archives https://archives.haute-
garonne.fr/ark:/44805/vta2f1ae19d044c2aca/daoloc/0#id:985074546?gallery=true&brightness=100.00&c
ontrast=100.00.  
26 Two notaries over the period 1660-1789 means 258 notary-year registers but there are only 167 notary-
years kept in the archives, leading to this estimated rate of loss of 35%. This rate of loss is quite low 
compared to other nearby cities; losses of at least 86% in Martres-Tolosane, 47% in Labarthe-sur-Lèze, 
and 59% in Saint Sulpice. 
27 As a matter of comparison, Dennison and Ogilvie (2014) compiled 365 research studies in European 




for the husband were admitted, however.28 We verified that this sample is not biased 
compared to the whole sample of marriage. First, the number of marriages we focus on 
is highly (0.43) and significantly correlated with the number of marriages observed 
each year in the parish registers. Second, our sub-sample exhibits no statistical 
difference (see Appendix C) in terms of number of children, wealth per marriage or 
frequency of Stem settlement, which are potentially important factors. We have more 
marriages contracted by Crafstmen and fewer by Plowmen, while we have more 
daughters of Craftsmen and Textile workers in our sub-sample. Fortunately, our 
subsequent investigations (Table 3) show that husband’s activity was never, and wife’s 
father’s activity was unlikely to be, associated with FAM.  
Migration censoring 
Our observations could be biased if many migrations occurred during bad times. Our 
sample does include spouses not born in MV but for which the birth date was recorded 
in the marriage contract. As a result, any potential bias could mainly come from the 
leavers, because our sample observes only the marriages of those staying in, or coming 
to MV. Fortunately, migrations, especially marital migrations, were infrequent in 
France (Poussou, 2002) compared to what has been documented for England (Clark 
and Souden, 1987). About 79% of the spouses of south-west France (1740-1789) were 
born in the parish where they married or within 5 kilometers; only 6% of the spouses 
were not born in the diocese (Houdailles and Bonneuil, 1992). This phenomenon was 
even more pronounced when focusing on rural areas. For instance, in Les Barronies 
(near Tarbes, about 100 km from MV), in 1793 only 12% of the inhabitants were not 
born in their parish (see Poussou, 2002). In MV, in the cadaster of 1662, we know that 
9.7% of the owners, known as horsains, were not living in the village.   
We confirmed that in MV there were few leavers, and their departures were not 
correlated with economic conditions. Because land ownership was widely spread and 
all children had to be endowed with at least some assets at marriage or at father’s 
death, almost all inhabitants theoretically owned some property. People leaving MV 
also owned, or would inherit, at least a few plots of lands. Due to the cost of managing 
remote properties, they tended to sell these lands. In the available notary registers, we 
observed 3,888 real estate transactions of properties in MV during our period; this 
surviving sample is random for the same reasons as those discussed concerning the 
 
28 If the bride was a widow, the marriage contracts mentioned the fact, and we double-checked our database 




marriage contract.29 79% of the sellers lived in MV (for comparison, 90% of the buyers). 
Among the “foreign” sellers, only 4.9% lived further than 30 km from MV and thus 
could be suspected of having fled bad economic conditions in MV, because we can 
assume the economic conditions to be similar within a radius of 30 km.30 
Moreover, these migrants from MV were not poor people. The average value of the 
sales of leavers from further than 30 km is 2.7 times higher than the value of sales by 
MV residents. The gentry (see below) represented 35% of the distant sellers compared 
to 22% for the MV-based sellers. Besides, we can specifically reject the idea that women 
would move far from MV to find a better economic life, because women represent the 
same 20% of the sellers for both those based in MV and those living more than 30 km 
abroad. Finally, there are no more sales from owners further than 30 km away during 
bad times.31  
 




Descriptive statistics of marriage patterns 
The average FAM is 24.35 with a standard deviation of 4.40 years. This figure is 
consistent with existing studies; for instance, Cummins (2013), who based his 
calculation on four villages from Louis Henry’s database, observes an average of 23.23. 
Figure 1 displays the 557 first marriages for which we have the FAM. At the bottom 
of the same figure, the number of yearly observations shows that our sample is well 
distributed over our time period. The average FAM (10-year rolling window) varies 
considerably over time; such a variation has been identified in several studies of 
 
29 Sales made by leavers recorded by a notary outside MV were sent to and published by the Enregistrement 
office.  
30 According to Frêche (1974: 27-35), significant migrations and land concentration may have started at 
the end of the 18th century. 
31 Correlation coefficients between the number of distant (>30 km) sellers and our measures of economic 
conditions range between 0.05 and 0.07 without any significance. 
number percentage average value (lt.) by women (%) by gentry (%)
Sellers in MV 3,095 79.60 163 21.7 22.1
Sellers < 10 km from MV 286 7.36 239 17.5 17.1
10 < Sellers < 20 km from MV 246 6.33 168 14.6 26.3
20 < Sellers < 30 km from MV 40 1.03 188 15.0 55.0
Sellers > 30 km from MV 192 4.94 443 20.3 35.4
Unknown 69 1.77 248 47.8 20.3




European historical demography, e.g. between the ages of 23 and 30 in Colyton, 





Figure 1. Female age at marriage over time 
Note: Due to the lack of a parish birth register (1700-1714), we have fewer observations of FAM about 
25 years later. 
 
This FAM is typical of western Europe, whereas other areas were characterized by 
lower values.33 In China at the same period, the FAM seems to be around 20 (Campbell 
and Lee, 2010). This EMP FAM can also be compared to current observations in some 
developing countries. For instance, in Nigeria (2008 census) the mean FAM is 17.7 
years (and 16 years in the North) with 27% married before age 15 (Adebowale et al., 
2012). Such a difference with what we observe in MV is not due to economic 
development, because the current GDP per capita in Nigeria is higher than it was in 
 
32 Others, such as Bardet (1983), see also Brée and de la Croix (2019), did not observe any variation over 
time. 





















































Female age at marriage (FAM)




MV before 1789 (1,711 1990-US dollars versus less than 1,000 in Old Regime France, 
according to Bolt and van Zanden, 2014). The figure is even more pronounced in 
Bangladesh with 91.4% of women married before the age of 20, with most of the 
marriages taking place at the ages of 13-16 years and only 8.6% of marriages occurring 
at the age of 20 or older (Goni and Rahman, 2012), for a GDP still higher than in Old 
Regime France (1,200 1990-US dollars). Formal institutions such as banking system, 
corporate solutions, market regulations, modern governance, and health system were 
also probably more developed in these countries than they were in MV. These 
comparisons support the idea that family behavior is a fundamental factor and not the 
outcome of other institutions or level of development.34 
For other characteristics than the FAM, we have much more data. The contribution 
to the settlement (1,100 observations) brought by the wife is higher in 55% of the 
contracts, compared to only 17% with a higher male contribution and 28% with strict 
equality. This observation supports the view according to which a woman needed to 
have enough capital, through advance on inheritance (given as dowry) or savings, to 
be able to marry. Among the 2,844 husbands for which the profession is mentioned, 
25% were Textile workers, 30% were Daymen, 21% were Plowmen, 19% were 
Craftsmen, and 6% were in the Others category, mainly involving high social positions 
(the “gentry”). The average husband’s wealth at marriage in the Others category is 
8.06 kg of silver versus 1.06 for Craftsmen, 0.7 for Textile workers, 0.62 for Plowmen 
and only 0.38 for Daymen.35  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of marriages. 
 
Sources: Parish and notaries registers (see text). 
Note: The number of children is slightly underestimated. 
 
 
34 See also a recent review of evidence supporting the theory that marriage patterns are culture-dependent 
accompanying a study of a Chinese case (Piotrowski et al., 2016). 
35 These categories are those frequently mentioned in the archives. 
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Female Age at First Mariage 24.35 24.00 4.40 14 42 557
Male Age at Marriage 27.07 26.00 6.48 13 59 458
Wealth Wife (Kg Silver) 1.56 0.53 3.75 0 48.6 1098
Wealth Husband (Kg Silver) 1.35 0.35 4.05 0 68.4 1116




After excluding second marriage, the 1,275 first marriages for women generate an 
average of 3.55 live births.36 The total number of annual births varied between 33 and 
129 babies with an average of 75. The number was around 100 at the beginning of the 
period and started to decline before rising again at the end of the 18th century. We can 
confidently calculate a crude birth rate using the population census of 1793 (2,670 
inhabitants). The average birth number between 1779 and 1789 was 91, leading to a 
crude birth rate of 34‰. This low rate is consistent with the low number of children 
per marriage we document, and similar to previous studies on the area; Frêche (1974) 
measures a rate of 36‰ in 1695 and 31‰ in the middle of the 18th century.  
These statistics depict a low fertility compared to what was observed for other 
European populations at this time. For instance, at the other end of the spectrum is 
the French population settled in Quebec with about 10 children per woman (Galor and 
Klemp, 2014). At the end of the 19th century, England still had a 40‰ birth rate 
(Chesnais, 1992). MV illustrates the early low fertility level observed in France, 
especially in the south-west (van de Walle, 2016).37  
Historical demographers explain the low fertility of south-west France through a higher 
interval between births (within marriage) rather than a later FAM (Flandrin, 1976). 
The main identified mechanism reducing marital fertility is the very long breastfeeding 
period, which increased the time lapse between two potential pregnancies due to 
lactational amenorrhea (Fine-Souriac, 1978; Sangoï, 1985).38 This long breastfeeding is 
facilitated by the Stem family: when the mother cares for the children (including 
breastfeeding) her work can be performed by the grandmother or aunts (Fine-Souriac, 
1978). The inheritance practice to favor a single heir in the transmission of assets also 
provides a strong incentive to limit births, because the ideal number of siblings is two: 
 
36 The number of children born per woman during her whole life is slightly higher, because a woman can 
remarry. Moreover, this statistic is only indicative, our main goal is to build accurate data of marriage 
behavior rather than a perfect measure of fertility. The number of children per marriage is underestimated 
due to migration censoring (we are able to count only births recorded in MV, excluding births occurring 
after a family move) and the absence of one missing parish register. 
37 Cummins (2013) stresses that the French case of early low fertility is difficult to reconcile with the 
demographic transition theory, the microeconomic theory of fertility, or the unified growth theory (UGT) 
but studying the factors explaining fertility across départements, Murphy (2015) find an effect of human 
capital formation consistent with the UGT. 
38 In other French regions such as the Paris basin or Normandy, a frequent practice was to put babies out 
for wet-nursing; in Rouen, Bardet (1983) observes rates between 41% for workers and 71% for gentry. 
This led to higher mortality and, whether as compensation or just as a mechanical consequence of the 




one heir and one to marry an heir or heiress (Fauve-Chamoux and Wall, 1997: 352). 
Thus, the low local fertility could ultimately be a consequence of the Stem family. 
Other scholars place more emphasis on the effect of the prevalence of small 
landholdings, or at least the small landholder mentality, seeking to transmit undivided 
properties (Ariès, 1975: 262). 
 
DOES FEMALE AGE AT MARRIAGE RESPOND TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS? 
A first view of the relationship between economic conditions and FAM is offered by 
the figures comparing the average FAM over time with our three economic proxies 
(standard deviation of wheat prices, tithes, and real estate transactions). The 
relationship with wheat volatility seems strong, whereas more noise appears with the 
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To properly assess whether there is a statistical relationship between the economic 
conditions and the FAM, we run survival regressions, a specific form of regression 
frequently used in biomedical science; a standard OLS would be inappropriate. A 
survival regression explains the length of time until an event occurs; for instance, the 
duration in weeks spent in remission from a disease can be explained by different factors 
such as gender, age, etc. We run survival regressions to model the time of female 
celibate life until marriage.  
In our study, the event is the marriage of a woman observed a certain number of years 
after the age of 14; we use the 14th birthday as the starting date of a potential marriage 
because this age is the earliest we observe in our database and is also close to the 
biological age allowing reproduction.39 We regress the number of years waited until 
marriage on our three proxies for economic conditions, controlling for other factors. We 
have a hazard function: 
ℎ = ℎ       (1) 
where  = exp and  =  + ⋯ +  
We assume that the baseline hazard function, ℎ, follows a Weibull distribution as 
is commonly done (e.g. Maitra, 2004); this distribution fits well with our data (see 
Appendix A).40  
The economic conditions impact the FAM as expected (see Table 3): a positive sign 
for wheat price volatility (uncertainty increases the FAM) and a negative sign for 
farming production (high farm production decreases the FAM) are both highly 
significant.41 Real estate activity shows a positive but not significant coefficient when 
alone in the regression, which becomes negative and significant (high real estate activity 
decreases the FAM as expected) when the three economic measures are used together 
(Column IV).42 However, in this last specification, the significance of wheat price 
 
39 In our sample we only have observations of the occurrence of the marriage event (i.e. we do not have 
censored observations). 
40 A Weibull distribution follows ℎ = . 
41 Results are about similar if, instead of using the tithe, we use the wheat price adjusted by the price of 
maize or rye to capture revenue from farming. 
42 We focus only on the sign and statistical significance of these coefficients, because their economic 




volatility disappears. It is not surprising to observe that certain of our three series 
become non-significant when used together, because they are designed to capture 
approximately the same phenomenon (i.e. the economic climate) and are thus exposed 
to the risk of multicollinearity.  
We also control for other contextual factors affecting all the marriages. The strong 
significance of wheat price volatility and farm production remains true. Military 
operations in Spain, requiring the inhabitants of MV to billet the soldiers at their 
expense, strongly raises the FAM, whereas the other variables controlling for the 
context, especially the institutional changes, appear to be non-significant. 
Lastly, we add controls for individual characteristics of the couples. Due to missing 
data, our sample decreases from 557 observations to only 358. Wheat price volatility 
remains highly significant both alone and when combined with the two other economic 
proxies. Real estate activity is only significant when taken alone, whereas the 
significance of farm production disappears. The weak significance of real estate activity 
in our different specifications is surprising. It may be that the specific behavior of real 
estate after 1770 shown in Figure 2 explains this weak significance. The strong increase 
in real estate activity (and prices) in this period is a well-known but unexplained 
phenomenon (Béaur, 2000).  
We are confident that the causality runs from economic conditions to FAM because no 
channel could link an individual age at marriage as a cause of our three measures of 
economic context. To be reassured about the causality link, we alternatively use a 
purely exogeneous proxy for economic condition: the grape harvest dates in Burgundy 
(Chuine et al., 2004). An early harvest implies that the end of spring and the summer 
have been hot and dry which is unfavorable for most crops. This proxy for weather 
(measured using the average for the previous 10 years) is also significantly associated 
with a higher FAM (Column XIII). Finally, our results remain almost identical when 
running our complete regressions again but on a subsample excluding marriages 
celebrated between 1730-1750 (Columns XIV-XVII). Indeed, we have fewer 
observations of FAM due to the missing parish register (and no bride above 30 years 
old) during this period, which could potentially bias our results. 
Among the individual controls, marriages with settlement in an existing family is 
clearly associated with a lower FAM and also with a lower MAM (see Appendix B). 




generate the entirety of their resources. However, even in a Stem family area, a large 
majority of the population (79% of our marriages are without Stem settlement) had to 
provide their own resources, explaining why we found a significant relationship between 
economic situation and FAM in our study. 
It could be considered surprising not to observe any effect of wealth at marriage (sum 
of the wealth brought by the two spouses43) on the FAM, because high wealth could 
help women to marry early. This lack of effect is confirmed when professional status is 
not controlled for (Column XII), avoiding the risk that part of a potential wealth effect 
be captured by these social class dummies. A potential explanation of the lack of effect 
is that we observe wealth only at the date of the marriage and that, even those born 
poor have since been able to accumulate enough resources to settle. A girl who could 
not receive a dowry large enough to settle (as measured in addition to the wealth of 
her potential husband) might work to accumulate enough savings; we find many 
mentions of this behavior in the marriage contracts. Assuming that a minimum level 
of wealth is required to settle, it could be seen that ages of marriage vary according to 
initial wealth and speed of accumulation, but without any relationship between wealth 










Table 3: Effect of economic conditions on Female Age at Marriage  
 
Notes: The explained variable is the number of years waited between the age of 14 and the date of marriage. Significance, as measured by a Wald χ2, is reported 
using * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV) (XV) (XVI) (XVII)
Wheat 0.91*** 0.46 0.79*** 1.16*** 0.96** 0.72* 1.20** 0.96*
  volatility (0.30) (0.34) (0.30) (0.41) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44) (0.49)
Farming -0.20*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.28 -0.20 -0.27 -0.44** -0.32
  production (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Real estate 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
  activity (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Date of grape 0.23***
   harvest 0.07
Wars 0.13*** 0.10* 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.17** 0.20*** 0.16** 0.16** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.15** 0.20*** 0.14*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Diseases -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.13* -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Consulat -0.02 -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
State 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.31** 0.21 0.23* 0.27**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Taxation 2.21 3.89 -2.20 3.40 2.86 0.88 2.39 6.84* -1.23 6.36
(1.82) (3.51) (1.93) (3.55) (3.53) (1.63) (1.86) (3.72) (2.12) (3.78)
Wealth of 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  household (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stem -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
  settlement (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Husband -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06
  plowman (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Husband -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.01
  craftsman (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Husband -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
  textile (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Husband 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
  dayman (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Daughter of -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05
  plowman (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Daughter of -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.16** -0.13* -0.13* -0.14* -0.13*
  craftsman (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Daughter of -0.17** -0.17** -0.17** -0.17** -0.17** -0.15** -0.14** -0.15** -0.15**
  textile (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Daughter of -0.06 -0.09 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03
  dayman (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Intercept 2.33*** 2.75*** 2.50*** 2.93*** 2.34*** 2.81*** 2.40*** 2.32*** 2.82*** 3.04*** 2.73*** 2.73*** 2.72*** 2.26*** 2.82*** 2.89*** 2.56***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.27) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.22) (0.32) (0.32) (0.09) (0.17) (0.12) (0.29) (0.41)
Scale 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
N. obs. 557 557 557 557 557 557 557 358 358 358 358 364 358 309 309 309 309
Wald χ² 211*** 191*** 10** 660*** 188*** 354*** 103*** 198*** 288*** 849*** 175*** 138*** 155*** 250*** 222*** 325*** 43***
AIC 3203 3203 3212 3200 3203 3199 3208 2048 2054 2053 2050 2091 2028 1797 1799 1801 1796
Full sample excluding 1730-1750




Our investigation thus clearly demonstrates that FAM was sensitive to the economic 
situation, especially to economic uncertainty.44 Conversely, the MAM seems unrelated 
to economic conditions (Appendix B). As a matter of comparison, we should recall that 
other areas do not exhibit similar reactions to economic circumstances. For instance, 
in African countries recently, the fall of the GDP per capita has not been accompanied 
by a rise of FAM. Conversely, according to Garenne (2017), strong falls in economic 
conditions, such as the one observed in Madagascar (-51% of GDP per capita between 
1971 and 2002), are associated with a lower, and not a higher FAM. 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF FAM ADJUSTMENT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
We test three mechanisms through which the economic sensitivity of FAM can have 
consequences favorable to economic development.  
 
Adjustment of the number of children to economic conditions through FAM 
A first suspected positive consequence of a reaction of FAM to a changing economic 
situation is an adjustment of the population size to the available resources by reducing 
the number of children a woman will bear during bad times, and conversely. This 
phenomenon, a Malthusian preventive check, has long been stressed by historians: 
delayed marriage was “the true weapon of birth control in the Europe of the Ancien 
Régime” (Chaunu, 1966: 203) or the “key of the old demographic system” (Lebrun and 
Fauve-Chamous, 1988: 305).  
A Poisson count model is used for estimating the number of children born to each 
woman i, using her age at marriage FAMi as variable of interest and Xi as a set of 
control variables.  
 
 =  +  !" + #$ + %    (2) 
 
To assume a Poisson distribution could be viewed as inconsistent because our data, as 
frequently observed in historical demography, are over-dispersed. The mean total of 
children per marriage is 3.55 with a variance of 8.94 (standard deviation of 2.99, see 
 
44 This echoes a recent paper stressing the role of economic uncertainty in explaining the post-WWII baby-




Table 2), whereas in a Poisson law, mean and variance are supposed to be equal. 
Moreover, some couples could be unable to have children for biological reasons and 
others have no child in our database due to the absence of one parish register. To 
escape these biases, we constitute a subsample excluding 0-birth marriages, leading to 
a sample closer to a pure Poisson distribution (Mean = 4.27; Variance = 7.21). The 
results for this subsample appear on the right of Table 4. To avoid too easy an 
identification of variables as significant, we correct the standard errors for over-
dispersion of our observations.45 
As expected, FAM is strongly associated (with a negative sign) with the number of 
children produced per marriage. For instance, according to the unconditional 
relationship (Table 4, Column I), waiting ten years to marry at 24 instead of 14 reduced 
the number of children from 5.9 to 3.8; waiting 20 years (marrying at 34) reduced it to 
2.4.46 Since we have previously demonstrated an effect of the economic situation on 
FAM, we confirm a strong claim of the supporters of the EMP: the number of children 
is adjusted to the economic conditions through FAM.47 This result could be reinforced 
by a similar effect within marriage as observed in England at the same time (Cinnirella 
et al., 2017). Moreover, its effect could be combined with the Malthusian “positive 











45 We multiply the standard errors produced by the regression by &'( ) − +⁄ , with χ2 being the Pearson 
Chi square of the regression, n the number of observations and p the number of parameters (see Rodriguez, 
2013). 
46 For instance, the predicted number of children after waiting 10 years (marrying at 24) is given by exp 
(1.775 – 10*0.045) = 3.76. 
47 The number of children cannot cause the FAM. 
48 However, any high mortality due to economic crises disappeared in France at the beginning of the 18th 





Table 4. Effect of FAM on the number of children 
 
 
Notes: The explained variable is the number of children that a marriage produces. Standard errors, 
corrected for over-dispersion, are reported in brackets. Significance, as measured by a Wald χ2, is 
reported using * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Pseudo R2 is the Nagelkerke version. 
 
Does a high FAM raise a woman’s status in her couple? 
High status for women appears to be associated with economic development (Duflo, 
2012). A relatively high status of women is constitutive of the EMP compared to other 
family systems observed worldwide. But we test whether the sensitivity of FAM to 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VII)
FAM -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.054*** -0.034*** -0.040*** -0.034**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.015) (0.007) (0.009) (0.015)
Wealth of -0.017** -0.006 -0.016** -0.009 -0.008 -0.010
  household (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Stem -0.136 -0.259* -0.055 -0.136 -0.141 -0.068
  settlement (0.112) (0.134) (0.115) (0.095) (0.124) (0.098)
Husband 0.116 0.273 0.134 0.031 0.263 0.018
  plowman (0.492) (0.234) (0.171) (0.049) (0.214) (0.147)
Husband 0.259* 0.500*** 0.265* 0.136 0.386*** 0.116
  craftsman (0.133) (0.163) (0.133) (0.110) (0.147) (0.110)
Husband 0.240* 0.347** 0.255* 0.190* 0.370** 0.189*
  textile (0.134) (0.163) (0.138) (0.111) (0.146) (0.114)
Husband -0.095 -0.124 -0.124 -0.082 -0.121 -0.110
  dayman (0.129) (0.165) (0.133) (0.106) (0.150) (0.110)
Daughter of -0.036 -0.392* 0.018 -0.073 -0.262 -0.027
  plowman (0.172) (0.212) (0.178) (0.148) (0.195) (0.154)
Daughter of -0.252* -0.273 -0.212 -0.259** -0.200 -0.243*
  craftsman (0.145) (0.170) (0.151) (0.122) (0.155) (0.128)
Daughter of -0.285* -0.389** -0.211 -0.256** -0.245 -0.217
  textile (0.152) (0.194) (0.157) (0.128) (0.177) (0.134)
Daughter of -0.156 -0.323* -0.111 -0.176 -0.286 -0.146
  dayman (0.157) (0.188) (0.163) (0.132) (0.175) (0.139)
Husband's -0.015 -0.010
age at marriage (0.010) (0.009)
Time trend -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Intercept 1.775*** 2.100*** 2.806*** 1.474*** 1.820*** 2.258*** 2.410*** 1.763***
(0.006) (0.163) (0.324) (0.140) (0.065) (0.165) (0.328) (0.142)
N. obs. 543 354 150 354 458 298 137 297
Pearson χ² 1193 759 213 824 721 450 159 491
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.31 0.08





economic conditions improves the status of a western European woman within her 
couple in bad times.  
The age gap between spouses is a traditional indicator of the status of women in 
demography (see Bozon, 1991 as well as Barbieri et al., 2005 and Fengdan et al., 2016 
for recent uses and references). A small difference in ages between spouses reflects a 
couple being on an equal footing for the decisions of the household, whereas a large age 
gap implies that the husband exercises greater authority with the position of the wife 
being close to that of the children. Since dates of birth are frequently missing, we have 
few marriages for which we are sure of both FAM and MAM, so we rely on a reduced 
sample of 223 observations of difference in age. 
To test this potential positive consequence of the European marriage pattern, we run 
this kind of regression: 
-.)/. -1+2 =  +  !"2 + #$2 + %2   (3) 
with Gend. Gapm as the gender gap of marriage m, FAMm the female age at marriage 
m and Xm a matrix of variables specific to marriage m. 
Gend. Gapm is measured in three ways. Two gender age gaps are measured, first as the 
difference in age between the spouses, and then this difference is measured as a 
percentage of FAM rather than in years (a given difference in years would be less as 
FAM increases). Thirdly, we use the difference in the wealth brought by each spouse 
as mentioned in the marriage contract; the respective contributions to the settlement 
can reflect the more or less egalitarian nature of the relationship between the spouses. 
Observing that a low gender age gap is associated with a high FAM could be a 
correlation without causality. There is no theoretical guarantee that the causality runs 
from FAM to gender age gap. The opposite direction is also possible (i.e. potential 
spouses look for a specific gender gap, thus driving her FAM).49 We are thus faced with 
a simultaneous equations model in which gender gap at marriage depends on FAM and 
FAM can potentially depend on gender gap. To determine the effect of FAM, 
instrumental variables (IVs) that affect FAM but have no effect on gender gap should 
be used. 
 




To confirm that the causality runs from FAM to gender age gap, we thus instrument 
FAM by the economic conditions we have previously identified as influencing it (see 
Table 3); the survival regressions thus offer the first stage of our instrumented analysis. 
We assume that economic conditions offer a relevant instrument in our case because 
there is no theoretical reason to observe an effect of the economic conditions on the 
gender age gap through any other channel than FAM (exclusion restriction). The single 
potential link would be that during bad times, women look for husbands who are 
already rich (thus on average older), ensuring them a better standard of living. As a 
consequence, the gap would be higher whereas in our model, these bad economic 
conditions would lead to a high FAM and to a lower gap. As a consequence, the only 
mechanism that could be confounded with our instrument would have the opposite 
effect. These opposite predictions prevent the risk of being unable to distinguish 
between the two mechanisms at work.  
To explain our three measures of gender age gap, we thus run two sets of regressions: 
standard OLS using observed FAM, and IV regressions using the fitted value of FAM 
obtained from equation (1) instead of the observed FAM.50 However, a bias can occur 
in the error estimations of the second stage of our IV specifications, because errors of 
the first stage are not taken into account. To correct for this, we report standard errors 
estimated from bootstrap replications. For each IV specification, we ran 200 
replications after resampling with replacement. For each variable, the reported 
standard errors are the standard deviation of the 200 replicated coefficients. 
We found that a high FAM is strongly associated with a low difference in ages at 
marriage, even after controlling for individual factors. For instance, the gender gap was 
8.3 years for female marrying at 14 while it decreased to 4.2 after waiting 10 years 
(marrying at 24) and to -0.8 after waiting 20 years. Results, including magnitude of 
coefficients, are very similar in standard OLS and IV regressions. The relationship 
between FAM and gender age gap is true when gender age gap is measured both in 
number of years and in percentage relative to FAM. This reduced age gap when FAM 
is high suggests that FAM was more sensitive to economic conditions than MAM (i.e. 
during bad times FAM increased more than MAM, thus reducing the age gap). We 
confirm that MAM is less sensitive to economic conditions than FAM without any 
significance when controlling for individual characteristics, especially wealth (see 
 
50 We use model (IV) from Table 3 because this specification allows us to fit the FAM for all the marriages; 




Appendix B). However, turning to gender gap as proxied by gender difference in wealth 
at marriage, we do not observe any influencing factor. The difference in wealth at 
marriage appears uncorrelated with any of the factors we have already mobilized.  
Overall, an increase in women’s agency within the couple, as measured by the difference 
in age at marriage, is a clear positive consequence of the sensitivity of FAM to bad 
economic conditions. Couples formed during bad economic times constitute more 
efficient teams thanks to this greater agency of women. This positive outcome of bad 
economic times acts as an “automatic stabilizer”, combining its effect with the 




Table 5. Effect of FAM on the status of women
 
Notes: The explained variables are the gender age gap between spouses measured in years and in percentage relative to FAM. Standard errors appear in brackets. 
Standard errors of OLS models are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Standard errors of IV models are obtained from bootstrap. Significance is reported using * 
for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV
FAM -0.41*** -0.46*** -0.49*** -0.54** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Wealth of -0.14* -0.15* -0.01* -0.01* -0.04 -0.04
  household (0.06) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04)
Stem -1.47 -1.37 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.03
  settlement (1.11) (1.21) (0.06) (0.06) (0.30) (0.30)
Husband -2.77 -2.72 -0.15 -0.14* 0.18 0.17
  plowman (2.02) (2.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.25) (0.25)
Husband -3.21** -3.32* -0.15** -0.16** -0.16 -0.16
  craftsman (1.53) (1.71) (0.07) (0.07) (0.29) (0.29)
Husband -3.01** -3.11* -0.15** -0.16** 0.07 0.06
  textile (1.66) (1.87) (0.08) (0.08) (0.28) (0.28)
Husband -2.88* -2.95** -0.13* -0.13** 0.05 0.05
  dayman (1.51) (1.39) (0.07) (0.06) (0.23) (0.23)
Daughter of 1.08 0.94 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.13
  plowman (2.15) (2.59) (0.10) (0.11) (0.42) (0.42)
Daughter of 0.27 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.07
  craftsman (1.85) (1.92) (0.09) (0.09) (0.39) (0.39)
Daughter of 0.37 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.19 0.18
  textile (1.99) (1.96) (0.10) (0.10) (0.39) (0.39)
Daughter of -0.55 -0.72 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01
  dayman (1.84) (2.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.40) (0.40)
Intercept 8.33*** 12.16*** 9.47*** 13.57*** 0.46*** 0.67*** 0.52*** 0.75*** -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.18
(1.42) (3.79) (1.88) (2.75) (0.07) (0.22) (0.09) (0.26) (0.27) (0.77) (0.35) (0.84)
N. obs. 223 149 223 149 223 149 223 149 364 354 364 354
R2 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07




Does late marriage allow high investment in human capital? 
We now turn to a third positive outcome supposed by the proponents of the EMP. 
This mechanism was pointed out some time ago by Chaunu (1966), who claimed that 
late marriage favors investment in education, thus producing individuals better 
equipped to follow difficult paths. For the wife, higher investment becomes possible 
because she has a longer period during which to be educated before having her time 
occupied by maternity. For her children, a higher FAM means higher investment in 
human capital because of the reduced number of children (favoring quality, in Becker’s 
quantity-quality trade-off) and of the older mother having thus accumulated more 
human capital to be transmitted. We test whether a high FAM led to higher human 
capital for both women and children. 
We used literacy to proxy human capital. We collected signatures in the marriage 
contracts to document literacy. Most of the existing studies used parish registers but 
we noticed considerable inconsistencies in these registers leading to potential 
overestimation. The clerk usually mentioned the name of those among spouses and 
witnesses unable to sign and added “others have signed with me”, but most of the time 
not all the signatures of the “others” appear in the parish registers.51 Maybe the clerks 
simply did not write all the names of the persons unable to sign. On the other hand, 
the notaries also report the persons unable to sign and the “others”, but there is no 
discrepancy between this list of “others” and their signatures. We may suppose that 
the notaries were more scrupulous in the writing of documents. Overall, assessing 
literacy using the parish registers could result in a substantial overestimation of literacy 
compared to what is obtained using the notarial marriage contracts. 
Using the marriage contract, we have 1,293 observations for both spouses over our 
entire period. The average literacy rate is 8% for females and 27% for males, but these 
figures encompass very different periods. Surprisingly, literacy was higher at the end 
of the 17th century than a century later, especially for women. Figure 3 shows that 
female literacy fell from about 20% in 1690 to 10% twenty years later. An identical fall 
is observed for male literacy, from an initial rate above 30%, but while the male rate 
stabilized before recovering at the end of the 18th century, female literacy shows a 
gradual decrease, falling to less than 5% just before the Revolution. This decrease in 
 
51 For MV, we can exclude any problems caused by the copying of documents because the series we have 
are from the commune and not from the Intendant; for some locations, only the copies, thus potentially 




literacy over time is counterintuitive and inconsistent with most of our understanding 
of economic development, but concurs with existing studies. Houdaille (1977) 
documents a decline in female literacy during the 18th century in south west France, 
down to near total illiteracy in 1779.  
 
Figure 3. Male and female literacy over time 
 
We run regressions to explain the ability of a wife to sign her marriage contract, 
controlling for the social status of her father, the availability of a school using a dummy 
for women born before 1680 (a girl’s school was suppressed in 1686, see below) and 
FAM; we do not use the social status of her husband, nor the wealth at marriage 
because it could be endogenous to literacy. We run logistic regressions of this kind: 
345)167. =  +  !" + #$ + %    (4) 
with Signaturei as the ability of a woman i to sign her marriage contract, FAMi the 
female age at marriage and Xi a matrix of variables specific to woman i. 
FAM is not significant to explain literacy. The only significant variable is the social 
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category is “Others”, which encompasses the gentry (Table 6, left part). Thus, except 
for the fact that daughters from high social classes are literate, we are not able to 
distinguish any factor as relevant. Even the presence of a school is not significant.  
A second investigation concerns the effect of FAM on human capital of children. We 
examine the ability of the two spouses, both wife and husband, to sign according to 
the FAM of their mothers as well as control variables. We run logistic regressions of 
this kind: 
345)167.8 =  +  !"29:;<= 8 + #$8 + %8   (5) 
with Signatures as the ability of spouse s to sign his/her marriage contract, FAMmother s 
the female age at marriage of the mother of spouse s and Xs a matrix of variables 
specific to spouse s. 
Due to the several steps resulting in missing data, as explained in the previous sections 
(i.e. we need to identify the ability to sign, the date of birth, the mother and her date 
of birth), we have to rely on a reduced sample of only 63 observations for which we 
can link literacy to the mother’s age at marriage without any doubt. The mother’s age 
at marriage does not appear to be significant, but several control variables do provide 
certain empirical knowledge regarding different economic issues.  
Unsurprisingly, to be a male is associated with a higher probability of literacy. The 
wealth at marriage of the parents appears highly significant for explaining the literacy 
of the child. Conversely, to be raised in a Stem family has no impact, contradicting 
theories regarding this characteristic as favorable (Todd 1987; Le Bris, 2016). Nor is 
any significance observed for the number of brothers and sisters, rejecting the idea of 
a significant quantity-quality tradeoff. 
A state policy highly hostile to education could explain the lack of statistical evidence 
of the effect of FAM on human capital, as well as the decline in literacy over time. A 
school for girls established in MV was suppressed in 1686 after the dismantlement of 
its congregation, accused of spreading Jansenism. But the decline in female literacy is 
a general phenomenon in south west France at this time, thus suggesting more general 
causes. In 1590, the Provincial Council of Toulouse prescribed the creation of a school 
in each village specially to teach Catholic doctrine. At the beginning of our period, the 
inhabitants of MV chose to invest massively in education, since the wages of the 




1662). But the French state gradually took control of local expenditure, deciding 
cutbacks in education.52 From 1680 to 1750, the share of teaching in the budget was 
less than 10%. It was an official policy of the Intendants (local central state officers, 
predecessors of the modern Préfets) to suppress education in rural areas. The 
Intendants’ archives are full of requests from municipal consuls, supported by the 
Church, asking for authorization to pay for a schoolteacher (Mireille 1971). D’Etigny, 
the intendant of Auch from 1751, clearly explained that he suppressed all these school 
expenses when possible because teaching “just creates a population of idle fellows and 
bad citizens and reduces the number of agricultural workers while swelling the ranks 
of the useless who produce nothing for society” (Frêche 1974: 412-413).53  
Table 6. Effect of FAM on literacy  
Logit Probit Logit Probit




  FAM (0.31) (0.31)
School 0.04 0.03
(0.08) (0.08)
Daughter of -0.56*** -0.56***
  plowman (0.16) (0.16)
Daughter of -0.36*** -0.36***
  craftsman (0.10) (0.10)
Daughter of -0.40*** -0.40***
  textile (0.10) (0.10)
Daughter of -1.15*** -1.15***
  dayman (0.34) (0.34)
Wealth of 0.75** 0.79**
  household (0.30) (0.32)
Stem 0.18 0.19
  settlement (0.22) (0.22)
Number of 0.45 0.44
  siblings (0.33) (0.32)
Male 0.54** 0.56**
(0.27) (0.26)
N. obs. 377 377 63 63
R2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39
Literacy wife Literacy children
 
Notes: The explained variable is literacy, assessed by the signature on notarized marriage contracts. 
Coefficients are standardized. Standard errors appear in brackets. Significance is reported using * for 
10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. R2 is the Nagelkerke version. 
 
52 At the end of the 17th century, the Languedoc communes were heavily indebted, mainly because the 
state had imposed huge expenses for military purposes (Tallec, 2013: 631). 





This research provides strong empirical support for the existence of an EMP 
characterized by an adjustment of FAM to economic conditions. This adjustment 
provided an efficient answer to bad economic situations by preparing a better future 
through a reduced number of children and an improvement in women’s status within 
her couple. Regarding the discussions surrounding the EMP, we show that an EMP 
can be found in a Stem family area and that, while high female status is already a 
characteristic of societies under EMP, an increase in a woman’s agency within her 
couple is observed during bad times. The effects of EMP we have documented illustrate 
the Western European case of the more general theory linking family organization to 
several socio-economic outcomes.54  
Our findings also contribute to two keen debates. Our quantitative evidence showing 
the positive economic consequences of the EMP can explain the economic success of 
populations under EMP compared to areas in which Communitarian organizations 
dominate. However, having empirically demonstrated the positive effects of the EMP 
on economic development, we contest them as a sufficient condition for economic take-
off. Indeed, MV like all of southern Europe missed the accelerated growth recorded 
early in Northwest Europe. We can thus exclude this family behavior as the crucial 
explanation of the Little Divergence between southern and northern Europe (Van 
Zanden, 2009: 100; de Pleijt and van Zanden, 2020). Conversely, MV depicts a difficult 
path to modernity, especially a decrease in literacy in the 18th century, despite several 
apparent initial advantages (low fertility, relatively egalitarian wealth distribution, 
initially high literacy, proto-industrialization) including in terms of formal institutions 
(local and regional political life, no active guild, no prohibition of lending, insignificant 
feudality). A well-functioning EMP is not a highway for economic take-off. As an 
implication, other mechanisms, such as those developed in the Unified Growth Theory 
for instance, are required to explain the crucial growth acceleration.  
The second debate concerns theories about proto-industrialization (findings are 
grouped in Appendix D) that suppose a negative effect on FAM and a positive one on 
fertility. We can hypothesize that it was not industrialization per se that caused these 
relationships but a consequence occurring only when proto-industrialization created a 
better economic context. This reinterpretation would make it possible to reconcile the 
 
54 A more general framework of types of family and their social consequences has been proposed by Todd 




mixed results that studies on proto-industrialization areas have documented (i.e. cases 
of proto-industrialization with and without a decrease of FAM and more numerous 
children). Proto-industrialization would thus be encompassed in the more general 
theoretical framework this paper addresses.  
The demographic behavior under the EMP we have documented can be called an 
“homeostatic regime”, but one could also ask whether our investigation confirms the 
Malthusian model. As stressed by Guinnane and Ogilvie (2008), economists employ the 
term “Malthusian” too broadly while the true Malthusian economy supposes that: i. 
births depend on economic conditions, ii. deaths depend on economic conditions, and 
iii. economic conditions are a negative function of the number of people using a given 
stock of capital and natural resources. Our paper provides support only for the first 
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Appendix B: Effect of economic conditions on Male Age at Marriage (similar to Table 3 for FAM)  
  
Notes: The explained variable is the number of years waited between the age of 14 and the date of marriage. Significance, as measured by a Wald χ2, is reported 
using * for 10%, ** for 5% and *** for 1%. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII) (XIII) (XIV) (XV) (XVI) (XVII)
Wheat 1.75*** 1.53*** 1.69*** 0.65 1.19 1.19 0.75 1.04
  volatility (0.46) (0.52) (0.37) (0.56) (0.8350) (0.8350) (0.7446) (0.9104)
Farming -0.28*** -0.11 -0.21*** -0.07 0.35 0.35 -0.04 0.02
  production (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.2726) (0.4032) (0.4032) 0.16 (0.1825)
Real estate 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.05
  activity (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0846) (0.11)
Date of grape 0.14
   harvest (0.11)
Wars 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.48***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Diseases 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Consulat 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
State 0.18*** 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.18 -0.20 -0.20 -0.17
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Taxation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Wealth of -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01*
  household (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Stem -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22***
  settlement (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Plowman -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.28** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22* -0.25**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Craftsman -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.19** -0.20** -0.20*** -0.19**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Textile -0.17** -0.17* -0.18** -0.18** -0.20** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.18**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Dayman -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 -0.13 -0.18** -0.19** -0.20** -0.17*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Wife daughter of 0.20** 0.20** 0.21** 0.20** 0.19* 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
  plowman (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Wife daughter of 0.15* 0.16* 0.17* 0.15* 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
  craftsman (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Wife daughter of 0.17* 0.16* 0.16 0.17** 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.12
  textile (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Wife daughter of 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01
  dayman (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Intercept 2.42*** 3.12*** 2.65*** 2.53*** 2.41*** 3.03*** 2.65*** 2.72*** 2.90*** 2.91*** 2.54*** 2.57*** 3.01*** 3.01*** 3.21*** 3.12*** 2.93***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.36) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) (0.37) (0.42) (0.53) (0.25) (0.25) (0.38) (0.29) (0.53)
Scale 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N. obs. 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 148 148 148 148 153 148 140 140 140 140
Wald χ² 261*** 176*** 48** 155*** 441*** 115*** 70*** 60*** 83*** 79*** 141*** 97*** 140*** 116*** 338*** 239*** 106***
AIC 1415 1430 1431 1427 1486 1461 1459 945 943 936 951 976 948 881 876 877 879
Male Age at Marriage (MAM)










Appendix D: Additional insights on social status, wealth and proto-industrialization 
 
Since Goubert (1960: 77-80), several studies have observed different demographic 
regimes according to social status, especially delayed marriage for the lower classes (see 
several references in Eggerickx, 2015). For instance, Medick stressed that the delayed 
marriage phenomenon was more powerful for the lower classes (Medick, 1981: 76). Lee 
(1991) found that marriage for the wives of Daymen and Textile workers was delayed 
compared to the wives of Farmer-landowners. In Germanic areas, access to marriage 
was limited by formal local institutions to those considered sufficiently well-off 
(Guinnane and Ogilvie, 2008). Delayed marriage for the lower classes and the 
phenomena studied in this paper can be viewed as two manifestations of the same 
adjustment of marriage to economic conditions: “the difference between the 
demography of the poor and the wealthy is similar to the difference between the 
demographics of poor and wealthy periods” (Derouet, 1980).   
In MV, only daughters of Textile workers and Craftsmen had a significantly lower 
FAM. The social class of the husband is never significant. It is difficult to classify 
Craftsmen as of either low or high social class. We could expect to observe a 
value (I) N. obs value (II) N. obs value p-value
Wealth of  household (Kg. of silver) 2.92 1098 3.78 364 -0.85 0.10
Stem settlement (in %) 17.21 1284 14.90 557 2.31 0.21
Husband plowman (in %) 20.68 2844 12.65 514 8.03*** 0.00
Husband craftsman (in %) 18.71 2844 24.90 514 -6.20*** 0.00
Husband textile (in %) 24.58 2844 27.04 514 -2.46 0.25
Husband dayman (in %) 29.50 2844 30.35 514 -0.85 0.70
Daughter of plowman (in %) 15.43 1064 12.96 378 2.47 0.23
Daughter of craftsman (in %) 17.31 1064 24.87 378 -7.56*** 0.00
Daughter of textile (in %) 11.48 1064 20.37 378 -8.89*** 0.00
Daughter of dayman (in %) 25.59 1064 25.40 378 0.19*** 0.94
Number of children 3.51 1275 3.60 543 -0.09 0.00




significantly higher FAM for Daymen and the opposite for Plowmen, since they are 
considered as the two extreme social classes (excluding the gentry, classified as 
“Other”) but our data contradict this idea.55 The total wealth at marriage is without 
effect on FAM but significantly reduces the MAM. Moreover, in most cases the social 
status of the husband is significantly associated with a lower MAM; in Appendix B, 
the omitted category, “Other”, encompasses men in high social positions exhibiting 
much greater wealth brought to marriage (the average husband’s wealth at marriage 
in the Others category was about eight times higher than the average). Despite this 
over-control of wealth through social status, the two series appear significant, attesting 
the strength of wealth to reduce MAM, while the male gentry married later on average. 
Regarding the gender gap, the professional status of the father of the bride has no 
effect. However, the difference in age was less for women marrying a Dayman, a Textile 
worker or a Craftsman. Here again, the omitted professional status dummy is for 
“Other” professions that include gentry. These rich men frequently married women 
much younger than themselves. Their high social status made these large gender gap 
marriages possible for these men whereas standard (poor) workers married women of 
their own ages. But this high social class represented only a small proportion of the 
population (our category Others encompasses only 6% of all husbands). However, after 
control for social status, wealth (of the two spouses) is associated with a reduced gender 
gap, while Stem settlement is not associated with any specific gender gap.  
Finally, our results offer several insights regarding the different theories about “proto-
industrialization”. All the versions of these theories agree that this proto-
industrialization led to earlier marriage (and a higher number of siblings) due to the 
demand for children as workers and the freedom that these industries provided (Ogilvie, 
1997: 20). We do find that daughters of Textile workers, typical of these proto-
industries, married significantly earlier, although this is not true for wives of Textile 
workers (see Table 3), which makes it difficult to confirm the proto-industrialization 
claim.56  
 
55 Neither do we find more significance of the economic conditions by running our regressions (not reported) 
only on the daughters or wives of Daymen. The single result supporting this view is the fact that wealth 
at marriage correlates very significantly with a decrease in the FAM in this subsample. 
56 These results only partially confirm those observed in the Black Forest by Ogilvie; she found no effect 
of participating in proto-industry on men’s ages at marriage but a significantly higher age for women, 




However, clearer support for proto-industrialization theories is offered by the number 
of children. There is a wider debate about potential variations in fertility according to 
social class (see for instance Szreter, 1996; Barnes and Guinnane, 2012). We have 
previously observed that daughters of Craftsmen and Textile workers married early, 
but we found that these women had fewer children. However, this observation is made 
after controlling for FAM. When FAM is not controlled for (Table 4, Columns IV and 
VII), these daughters of proto-industrialization workers do not display any specific 
behavior regarding the number of their children. Conversely, wives of Craftsmen and 
Textile workers gave birth to a higher number of children in most of the specifications. 
In other words, girls from proto-industrialization families married early but did not 
have more children, whereas marrying a proto-industrialization worker did not lead to 
a lower FAM but produced more children.  
This higher number of children in the families of Textile workers and Craftsmen 
provides support for an important claim of the proto-industrialization theory, but the 
causality is perhaps simpler in our framework. The causal link in proto-industrialization 
theories is that children contribute positively to these family-based industrial activities. 
But we can hypothesize that this higher fertility was not a consequence of 
industrialization per se  but only occurred when proto-industrialization generated 
higher incomes. It might not be the necessity to have children for proto-industries that 
increased the fertility of the wife but the income that results from these activities that 
allowed a higher number of children.  
This reinterpretation would make it possible to reconcile the mixed results that studies 
on proto-industrialization areas have documented (i.e. cases of proto-industrialization 
with and without a decrease of FAM and more numerous children). Proto-
industrialization would thus be encompassed in the more general theoretical framework 
this paper addresses.  
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